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Trade Deficits Aren’t as Bad as You Think
We live in a global world. Ameri-
cans drive automobiles produced in 
Germany and drink Italian wine. Eu-
ropeans watch movies of Jedi Knights 
battling the Dark Side on televisions 
produced in Mexico. This was not al-
ways the case. 
For instance, the value of U.S. im-
ports of goods and services has grown 
from 5.1 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 1969 to 15.2 percent 
of GDP in 2004. Likewise, the value 
of U.S. exports of goods and services 
has grown from 5.3 percent of GDP in 
1969 to 10.0 percent of GDP in 2004.
The amount of U.S imports and 
exports has also varied quite a lot over 
time. At times, the U.S. has run trade 
surpluses, with exports exceeding 
imports, and at other times, it has run 
trade deficits, with imports exceeding 
exports. Recently, though, the U.S. has 
imported a lot more goods and services 
from abroad than it has exported to 
the rest of the world.  In 2004, this re-
sulted in the U.S. running a trade defi-
cit of 5.2 percent of GDP. Through the 
third quarter of 2005, the trade deficit 
has averaged 5.7 percent of GDP.
Some people react to the trade 
deficit with doom and gloom. They 
argue that the trade deficit is evidence 
that American firms are unproductive 
and can’t compete with foreign firms. 
Others point to it as clear evidence 
that foreign governments are not play-
ing fair in U.S. markets. Still others 
argue that it demonstrates that we are 
living beyond our means.
But there is an alternative view. In
this view, these unbalanced trade flows 
have two benefits: They shift world-
wide production to its most productive 
location, and they allow individuals to 
smooth out their consumption over the 
business cycle. According to this view, 
the trade balance declines, or moves 
into deficit, when a country’s firms or 
government is investing in physical 
capital to take advantage of productive 
opportunities. These investments ex-
pand the infrastructure, build capacity 
to access natural resources, and take 
advantage of new technologies. This 
increase in investment is financed in 
part by borrowing in international 
financial markets. By borrowing inter-
nationally, a country can invest more 
without cutting current consumption. 
When it repays this borrowing in the 
future, the trade balance increases or 
goes into surplus. In this respect, a 
trade deficit may be a sign of a grow-
ing and robust economy. Moreover, 
by increasing a country’s productive 
capacity, these unbalanced trade flows 
are vital to sustaining the economy’s 
expansion into the future. This view is 
consistent with some properties of the 




Before discussing the reasons that 
a country runs a trade deficit or sur-
plus, it’s useful to review the different 
lthough the amount of U.S. imports and 
exports has varied greatly over time, in recent 
years, the U.S. has been running trade deficits. 
Some people react to such trade deficits with 
doom and gloom; others cite them as evidence that foreign 
governments are not playing fair in U.S. markets; still 
others argue that deficits demonstrate that we are living 
beyond our means. In this article, George Alessandria 
offers an alternative view: Trade deficits have benefits. 
They shift worldwide production to its most productive 
locations, and they allow individuals to smooth out their 
consumption over the business cycle. measures of a country’s international 
transactions. These are recorded in the 
balance of payment accounts (Table 
1). The two main components of the 
balance of payments are the current 
account and the capital and financial 
account. The current account records 
the value of currently produced goods 
and services, both imported and ex-
ported, as well as the international 
payment of interest, dividends, wages, 
and transfers. The capital and finan-
cial account records transactions in 
real and financial assets.1
The easiest way to understand 
the components of the balance of 
payments is to think of a monthly 
credit card statement. One part of 
the statement reports the difference 
between new charges and payments. 
This difference corresponds to the 
current account. The second part of 
the statement shows the change in the 
balance on the account. This measures 
the amount of new borrowing from the 
credit card company and corresponds 
to the capital and financial account. 
By definition, any unpaid por-
tion of the bill adds one-for-one to the 
balance. Similarly, a current account 
deficit generates a capital and financial 
account surplus of equal magnitude. 
When a country is spending more 
than it earns, it is also selling assets to 
foreigners.
The left half of Table 1 summa-
rizes the different components of the 
U.S.’s $668 billion current account 
deficit in 2004. From this we see that 
the trade balance, which is the differ-
ence between the value of exports and 
the value of imports, was the largest 
determinant of the current account 
deficit. But there are two additional, 
smaller components: net unilateral 
transfers and net income from abroad. 
Net unilateral transfers measure the 
value of gifts, foreign aid, and non-
military grants. Net foreign income 
measures the difference of income 
payments to American capital and 
workers employed overseas and income 
payments to foreign capital and work-
ers employed here.2 For the U.S., net 
foreign income mostly depends on the 
difference in capital income — that 
is, the difference between interest 
and profit payments to Americans on 
overseas investments and interest and 
profit payments to foreigners from in-
vestments in the U.S.
To finance its current account 
deficit, the U.S. ran a capital and 
financial account surplus of $668 bil-
lion. Foreign purchases of U.S. assets 
exceeded U.S. purchases of foreign 
assets by $668 billion. These foreign 
purchases of American assets funneled 
foreign savings toward the U.S. Thus, a 
current account deficit represents pe-
riods when foreign savings are flowing 
into a country. 
This brings us to another way of 
measuring the current account: as the 
difference between a country’s sav-
ings and investment. Savings is the 
difference between what a country 
produces, measured as GDP, and what 
is consumed privately and by the gov-
1In the balance of payments accounts, the pur-
chase and sale of assets by central banks, such 
as the Federal Reserve in the U.S., are often 
measured separately in the official settlements 
balance. To simplify the presentation, we have 
included these transactions in the capital and 
financial account. In 2004, net purchases by 
foreign central banks equaled $392 billion, or 
59 percent, of the capital and financial account. 
For more information on the official settlements 
balance, see the Survey of Current Business, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, July 2005.
TABLE 1
U.S. Balance of Payments, 2004*
(Billions of Dollars)
Current Account Capital and Financial Account
Net Exports -617.5 Capital Account -1.6
Net Income Receipts 30.4 Financial Account 584.6
Net Unilateral Transfers -80.9  Statistical Discrepancy 85.1
Capital and
Current Account Balance -668 Financial Account Balance 668
*Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Balance of Payments 
Accounts. Details may not add to totals because of rounding. For more details, 
see the July issue of the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Survey of Current 
Business.
2A growing and serious concern about measur-
ing the current account is how we treat capital 
gains and losses on cross-border asset holdings. 
Economists Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and 
Helene Rey construct a measure of the current 
account with this adjustment and show that 
current account fluctuations are substantially 
smaller. In fact, recently, those periods in which 
the U.S. has run large trade deficits also tended 
to be those periods in which American asset 
holdings overseas made large capital gains rela-
tive to foreign assets in the U.S.
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4 Countries are composed of individuals, firms, 
and governments. However, individuals own 
firms and governments are made up of people. 
So, for simplicity, we view countries as a collec-
tion of individuals.
ernment.3 When investment exceeds 
savings, a country finances this gap by 
borrowing from abroad. 
Since 1929, the current account 
and the trade balance have been 
nearly identical. The average differ-
ence is 0.02 percent of GDP. There 
have been some large differences of up 
to 1 percent of GDP, but these have 
generally been short-lived. This may 
not continue to be the case. If the U.S.
continues to run large current account 
deficits and to borrow from the rest of 
the world, the stock of foreign assets in 
the U.S. will grow relative to the stock 
of U.S. assets overseas. The payments 
on this debt can lead to deficits in the 
future, just as a high credit card bal-
ance today means more interest pay-
ments in the future.
For now, though, we will consider 
the current account and the trade bal-
ance interchangeably, partly because, 
as we have seen, historically they have 
not differed by much.
INTRODUCING
INTERTEMPORAL TRADE
Just as an increase in the bal-
ance on a credit card bill involves new 
borrowing from the credit card com-
pany, when foreigners buy U.S. assets, 
Americans are borrowing from the 
rest of the world. This international 
borrowing and lending is based on the 
concept of intertemporal trade. The 
notion of intertemporal trade is based 
on the idea that people’s purchases and 
income may not always match up over 
time. When this occurs, people use fi-
nancial markets to borrow and save to 
make up the difference between what 
they buy and what they earn.
Countries are just a collection of 
individuals:4 When these individu-
als collectively spend more than they 
earn, they finance the difference by ei-
ther selling assets or borrowing. How-
ever, I might go to my neighbor (indi-
rectly through a bank or credit card) 
to borrow the amount by which my 
purchases exceed my income. When a 
country’s purchases exceed its income, 
it pays for the difference by borrow-
ing from its trading partners. Thus, a 
country can have a trade deficit either 
because it is borrowing or because it 
has made some loans in the past for 
which it is currently being repaid. 
A useful way to think about in-
tertemporal trade is to consider the 
life cycle of a typical doctor. When 
she is young, she does not have many 
skills. Rather than work at a low-wage 
job, she goes to college and then on to 
medical school, followed by an intern-
ship and residency. Before starting to 
work, she has little to no income, so 
she must borrow to pay for school and 
her living expenses. While in school, 
she is investing in accumulating skills. 
These skills raise the wage she can 
command once she is working. In this 
case, she borrows when she is young 
and invests in education. Once out of 
school, she can repay these loans and 
start accumulating savings for retire-
ment. Through financial markets she 
lends her savings to finance other peo-
ple’s investments. Once she has retired, 
her income is low again, and she lives 
off the income from her savings. 
This borrowing and lending over 
her lifetime reflects intertemporal 
trade. She has traded part of her in-
come stream when she is working for 
some payments when she is young and 
some payments when she is old. This 
intertemporal trade can involve long 
periods of borrowing and long periods 
of saving.5 This borrowing and lending 
is efficient, since it allows a person to 
enter a profession, such as medicine, 
that makes the best use of her abilities.
International financial markets al-
low countries to borrow and lend over 
time through the purchase and sale 
of financial assets. Just as the doctor 
benefits from intertemporal trade, in-
ternational financial markets generate 
similar benefits. Let’s consider two im-
portant reasons why countries borrow 
and lend over time.
International Production Shift-
ing. The basis of the idea of interna-
tional production shifting is the notion 
that you want to make hay while the 
sun shines. That is, when good produc-
tive opportunities present themselves, 
people can take advantage of them by 
investing and working more. 
Over time, the productive op-
portunities in a country change. New 
opportunities present themselves and 
old ones close. Some industries make 
technological advances, while others 
3For those familiar with national income and 
product accounts, this is the familiar relation-
ship: Trade Balance =Savings-Investment, 
where Savings = GDP-Private Consumption-
Government Consumption.
International financial markets allow countries 
to borrow and lend over time through the 
purchase and sale of financial assets. 
5Strictly speaking, when our doctor borrows to 
finance her education and expenditures, she is 
selling a financial asset with a claim against her 
future income. Lenders carry these assets as a 
credit on their balance sheets.4Q 1 2 0 0 7 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
become obsolete. Some of these oppor-
tunities are small, and others are large. 
To take advantage of these opportuni-
ties, firms need to hire workers and 
invest in new equipment, structures, 
and software. 
Norway provides a clear example 
of one of these productive opportu-
nities. In the 1960s, rich petroleum 
deposits were discovered in the North 
Sea. Norway was one of the major ben-
eficiaries of this discovery. Getting to 
these valuable oil and gas deposits re-
quired large and repeated investments 
in infrastructure, such as off-shore oil 
platforms, transport pipelines, ships, 
and helicopters. Norway also needed 
to develop a knowledge of exploration 
and extraction to precisely locate and 
exploit these resources. At the time of 
these discoveries, Norway lacked the 
equipment and expertise to take ad-
vantage of the opportunity. To do so, it 
borrowed from the rest of the world. 
Because of the time involved in 
building infrastructure, oil production 
did not start in earnest until the mid-
1970s. Although the oil revenue would 
eventually pay for them, the invest-
ments had to be paid for in advance. 
Norway financed these investments 
by borrowing from abroad (Figure 1). 
From the figure, we can see Norwegian 
investment grew substantially from 
1969 to 1977, financed in part by a 
series of almost continual trade deficits 
from 1969 to 1977. 
Once the oil came online, Nor-
way began running persistent trade 
surpluses, which were used to repay 
its original borrowing and to save for 
the day when the petroleum reserves 
are exhausted. We can see that, since 
1978, Norway has annually run trade 
surpluses that average 6 percent of 
GDP. There have been some fluctua-
tions in the size of these trade surplus-
es because of changes in the price of 
oil and the Norwegian business cycle. 
(See The Terms of Trade and A Theory 
6Some international lending is done by foreign 
governments. In the case of the U.S., recently 
these foreign investments have tended to be 
in relatively low-interest bearing, highly liquid 
assets. Arguably, the liquidity these investments 
provide is highly valued by foreign governments 
and compensates for the relatively low returns.
FIGURE 1
Norwegian Investment and Trade Balance
of International Business Cycles, for a 
further discussion of these two forms 
of trade-balance fluctuations.) 
The Norway story is an example 
of a large productive opportunity, but 
there are also smaller changes in pro-
ductivity that may be important over 
the business cycle. For instance, in the 
1990s, the information technology and 
telecommunication sectors in the U.S.
developed many new technologies.
These productive opportunities 
affect both the private and public sec-
tors. For instance, in Norway, the state 
had sovereignty over the exploration 
and production of sub-sea natural 
resources, and much of the develop-
ment was done within state-owned 
enterprises. To take advantage of pro-
ductive opportunities, firms and gov-
ernments need to invest in machines 
and infrastructure. This can be done 
by borrowing capital from the rest of 
the world. Foreign investors are happy 
to make these loans, even if it means 
less investment in the investors’ own 
countries, because the capital is more 
productive overseas and thus earns a 
higher return.6 This increase in invest-
ment increases the productive capacity 
of an economy in subsequent periods 
and keeps the economy going strong 
into the future.
Smoothing Consumption. An-
other important idea for understanding 
the dynamics of the current account 
is consumption smoothing: the notion 
that people would prefer a relatively 












*Data are from Statistics Norway.The Terms of Trade
T
FIGURE
U.S. Oil Trade Balance and Oil Terms of Trade
* Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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here is another important determinant 
of the trade balance: the terms of trade. 
This is the price of imports relative to the 
price of exports.
Over time, the terms of trade may 
vary because the cost of producing imports or exports 
changes or the demand for these goods changes. Quite 
often, we see that when the terms of trade worsen, so 
that imports become more expensive, the trade balance 
declines. This often occurs because, despite the relatively 
high price of imports, we do not cut back much on our 
purchase of these imports. If we hold quantities roughly 
constant, and the terms of trade increase, the trade bal-
ance will decrease. This has been an important source of 
fluctuations in the trade balance over time.
Oil is one good that the U.S imports a lot of, and the 
demand for oil is fairly slow to respond to price changes. 
This slow response occurs in part because oil is an im-
portant input into production in industries such as trans-
portation and energy and there are few substitutes for 
oil. These industries have made large investments in air-
planes, trucks, and power plants whose energy efficiency 
is largely fixed. 
Therefore, just as it is 
costly for the owner of a gas-
guzzling SUV to sell that 
car and buy a smaller, more 
energy-efficient car, it is dif-
ficult for an industry to change 
its use of oil in the short run. 
Thus, an increase in the price 
of oil tends to raise the value 
of imports almost one-for-one 
and lowers the trade balance 
by the same amount in the 
short run. In the long run, 
after firms and individuals 
invest in new, energy-efficient 
technologies, the demand 
for oil declines, so imports 
decline and the trade balance 
increases. 
The figure bears this out. 
It shows the trade balance in 
petroleum and the price of 
petroleum imports deflated by 
the price of exports. Notice 
that these variables tend to move in opposite direc-
tions. In particular, notice that the large increases in 
oil prices in 1973 and 1979 were associated with large 
decreases in the trade balance. More recently, the ris-
ing price of oil has contributed to the worsening trade 
balance.*
If we return to the case of Norway, which is a 
large exporter of oil, we see that changes in the price 
of oil affect its trade balance in the exact opposite way. 
From Figure 1 in the text, we can see that Norway’s 
trade balance has increased substantially along with 
the increase in oil prices since 1998. Similarly, the big 
drop in Norway’s trade balance in 1985 coincided with 
a drop in the price of oil. 
More generally, the terms of trade can matter for 
other goods, such as certain industrial supplies, agri-
cultural products, and capital equipment, for which 
demand is relatively insensitive to changes in price in 
the short run.
* David Backus and Mario Crucini have shown that the market 
for oil can help to explain some of the behavior of the U.S. trade 
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Oil trade balance as share of GDP
(percent) Oil terms of tradeA simple example should make 
this clear. Suppose you could choose 
between consuming $50,000 this year 
and $100,000 the following year or 
consuming $75,000 each year for the 
next two years. Most people would pre-
fer the second plan, that is, a smooth 
pattern of consumption.
Now, suppose your income varies, 
as in the first plan. These types of in-
A Theory of International Business Cycles
E
conomists David Backus, Patrick Kehoe, and Nobel Prize 
recipient Finn Kydland have shown that an international real-
business-cycle model can account for the properties of business 
cycles in the G7 countries.* This is a model that includes both 
consumption smoothing and production shifting.
In their view, the efficiency with which countries use capital and labor 
varies over time. These changes in productivity are generally not synchronized 
across countries, so that productivity may differ internationally. When there are 
productivity differences across countries, it makes sense to reduce investment 
in those countries where productivity is relatively low while increasing 
investment in the country where productivity is relatively high. 
Initially, this requires the trade balance of the high productivity country to 
decline. This effectively shifts production to the more productive location. The 
larger the differences in international productivity, the greater the incentives to 
shift production toward the more productive countries and the larger the trade 
deficit. 
Because investment raises a country’s stock of capital, these capital flows 
tend to raise future output and lead to sustained increases in output. Foreign 
investors are happy to make these loans because they can get a better return 
by lending to firms in the country with more productive opportunities. Notice 
that by borrowing from abroad, the more productive country does not have to 
sacrifice consumption to invest in these opportunities, allowing it to keep its 
consumption smoother.
Economist Martin Boileau has shown that the effect of production shifting 
is particularly important, since a large part of trade consists of capital and 
durable goods, such as industrial machines, aircraft, and automobiles. Thus, 
periods when investment is high are also periods in which imports will tend to 
be high. Moreover, if investment is low in the rest of the world, a country will 
tend to run a trade deficit. 
* For a primer on the real-business-cycle view of the macroeconomy, see the article by Satyajit 
Chatterjee.
come variations tend to occur because 
some workers receive bonuses and oth-
ers may temporarily lose their jobs. If
households can’t save or borrow, their 
consumption will follow their income 
and will vary over time. Suppose one 
can borrow at a zero interest rate. 
Then by borrowing $25,000 in the first 
year and repaying it in the second year, 
a household can even out this varia-
tion in income to achieve a smooth 
pattern of consumption. 
Now imagine we restrict house-
holds to borrowing and lending from 
households in the same country. To 
smooth out consumption, we need to 
find someone from the same country 
willing to lend $25,000 in the first 
year and be repaid in the second year. 
Financial markets do this for us. They 
channel savings from those households 
with temporarily high incomes to 
those households with temporarily low 
incomes. This lets us smooth out the 
household-specific fluctuations in indi-
vidual income.
But what happens when everyone 
in the same country experiences the 
same shock to their income, as in a re-
cession? For instance, suppose average 
income in a country is $50,000 in year 
1 and $100,000 in year 2. If we restrict 
borrowing and lending with foreign 
countries, consumption will vary along 
with income. If we allow international 
borrowing and lending, consumption 
smoothing will lead to a $25,000 cur-
rent account deficit in year 1 and a 
$25,000 current account surplus in 
year 2. So countries can use interna-
tional financial markets to smooth out 
countrywide fluctuations in income, 
such as those that occur over the busi-
ness cycle.7
With these ideas in mind, let’s 
take a look at the U.S. current account 
over time.
7 Similarly, fluctuations in government ex-
penditures can be smoothed out by borrowing 
internationally. When government expenditures 
exceed tax revenue, the resulting government 
fiscal deficit is financed by borrowing. Whether 
this borrowing results in a current account defi-
cit depends on the private savings response of a 
country’s citizens. It is often claimed that fiscal 
deficits go hand-in-hand with trade deficits. 
For the U.S., there are certainly periods with 
these twin deficits, but there are also periods 
of government surpluses and trade deficits. See 
the article by Michele Cavallo for a summary 
of the links between fiscal and current account 
deficits.
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an approximation, assuming a 2 percent annual 
growth rate. 
9From the conclusion of the American Civil 
War, the American railroad system expanded 
from 35,021 miles in 1865 to 74,096 miles in 
1875 and 128,320 miles in 1885. (Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States: Bicentennial edition, 
1975)
10 See the book by Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey 
Williamson, p. 211.
A LONG-TERM VIEW OF THE 
U.S. CURRENT ACCOUNT
It’s not possible to describe in 
detail all the ups and downs of the 
current account, so let’s focus on some 
particular periods and events that are 
important in U.S. history (Figure 2).8
First, let’s consider the second-
half of the 19th century. In this period, 
the U.S. was still a relatively small 
economy that was poised for major 
economic expansion. The country ex-
perienced substantial immigration, and 
there was a great migration westward. 
The American railroad network was 
built, and municipalities invested in 
infrastructure such as ports, roads, and 
municipal sewage.9 During this period, 
the U.S. ran current account deficits 
each year from 1862 to 1876 and 1882 
to 1896. Over these two periods, the 
average annual current account defi-
cit was 1.5 percent of GDP. Investors 
in London invested heavily in these 
enterprises, since the returns to these 
projects exceeded those to be found in 
England.10 These trade deficits helped 
finance the American economic ex-
pansion and were followed by a long 
period of current account surpluses. 
Second, let’s consider the periods 
around the two world wars, during 
which the U.S. ran large and persistent 
current account surpluses. From 1915 
to 1921, the U.S. annually ran current 
account surpluses, on average, of 4.1 
percent of GDP. These loans financed 
both the war effort of its allies as well 
as their subsequent postwar recon-
struction. 
The dynamics of the U.S. cur-
rent account around World War II are 
similar to those in the period around 
World War I. In the buildup to the 
second world war and before the U.S.
entered the war, from 1938 to 1941, 
the U.S. ran annual current account 
surpluses of 1.3 percent of GDP. Much 
of this lending financed the United 
Kingdom’s war effort. From the U.S.
perspective, this was a very good in-
vestment. Once the U.S. entered the 
war, it financed its war effort in part 
by borrowing from its trading partners. 
Thus, from 1942 to 1945, the U.S. ran 
small current account deficits.
Following World War II, the U.S.
ran some very large trade surpluses 
from 1946 to 1949. A large amount 
of both lending and foreign aid was 
directed toward Europe and Japan to 
help them rebuild. Given the lack of 
productive capital in place in these 
countries and their relatively highly 
skilled work forces, the goods from 
the U.S. were effectively used to build 
up the productive capacity of these 
countries. These surpluses were very 
important for rebuilding the European 
nations and Japan following WWII.
Finally, a careful eye may notice 
that the behavior of the current ac-
count since 1980 appears to have a lot 
in common with the period from 1860 
to 1914. In both periods, there are 
large, sustained swings in the current 
account. In contrast, in the interwar 
and postwar periods, fluctuations tend-
ed to be small and tended toward bal-
anced trade. These differences across 
eras are a sign of the uneven progress 
toward the current world of unrestrict-
ed capital flows across borders.
International financial flows were 
much greater in the period before 
World War I because there were very 
few restrictions on them. Following 
WWI, a number of restrictions were 
FIGURE 2
U.S. Current Account
*The U.S. current account is constructed from multiple sources. The period from 1929 is based 
on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The data from 1869 to 1929 are from the study by 
Maurice Obstfeld and Matthew Jones. The current account data from 1860 to 1869 are also from 
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Business Review Q1 2007 7 www.philadelphiafed.org11 The Group of 7 is a coalition of the major 
industrial nations: Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States.
12 Nobel laureate Robert Lucas has argued that 
business cycles can be thought of as deviations 
from a trend around which variables tend to 
move together. Thus, we want to focus on the 
medium-term fluctuations in economic activity. 
These are the fluctuations that last from a year 
and a half to eight years. We don’t think of very 
short-run changes in the economic environ-
ment, such as those due to really bad weather, 
as being part of the business cycle. We also don’t 
think of the really long-term changes in the 
economy, such as those arising from increased 
female participation in the labor force, as being 
part of the business cycle. These are more relat-
ed to the trend component of the economy. All 
of the statistics reported in Table 2 are based on 
these medium-term fluctuations. 
placed on the mobility of interna-
tional capital, and they were further 
increased during the Great Depression 
(1929 to 1939). The postwar financial 
system maintained these restrictions, 
which were only gradually loosened in 
the 1970s. Thus, while today’s current 
account deficits are quite large, the 
comparison with the postwar period, 
when capital flows were partially re-
stricted, exaggerates their magnitude.
COMMON FEATURES OF 
RECENT TRADE DYNAMICS 
ACROSS COUNTRIES
Over long periods of American 
history, we’ve seen that production 
shifting and consumption smoothing 
have mattered for the trade balance. 
Now, we want to see if the same is true 
over the business cycle and for other 
countries. We can do this by studying 
how the trade balance and other key 
measures of economic activity vary 
over time for a group of industrialized 
countries.
First, we can look at some proper-
ties of the trade balance, output, con-
sumption, and investment for the G7 
countries11 in the period 1980 to 2002 
(Table 2).12 From the table we see that 
certain features of the business cycle 
are quite similar across countries.13
From the first two columns, we see 
that fluctuations in consumption are 
generally smaller than fluctuations in 
output, while fluctuations in invest-
ment are much larger than fluctua-
tions in output. The second common 
feature is that both consumption 
and investment are highly correlated 
with output. What this means is that 
when output is growing fast, as in an 
economic expansion, both investment 
and consumption are also growing. 
Since investment is more volatile than 
output, investment grows much faster 
than output. From our earlier account-
ing, this implies that the trade balance 
should be declining. In fact, from the 
fifth column we see that trade bal-
ances are negatively correlated with 
output, so that during economic 
expansions a country’s trade balance 
tends to decline. 
If we put these facts together, a 
common picture of business cycles 
emerges. When countries are expand-
ing, they tend to be investing quite a 
bit. Some of the extra production not 
consumed is invested, but a lot of the 
resources for investment come from 
outside the country, so the country 
runs a trade deficit. Borrowing abroad 
to increase investment contributes to 
future increases in GDP without re-
quiring cuts in current consumption.
A CONTRARIAN VIEW OF THE 
TRADE DEFICIT
The view developed here is that 
the trade balance reflects the optimal 
response of individuals, firms, inves-
tors, and governments to changes in 
productive opportunities and needs 
throughout the world. However, an 
alternative view argues that trade 
deficits may result from individu-
als borrowing to spend beyond their 
means. For instance, individuals may 
not fully take into account the size 
of their future expenditures, such as 
those from government-sponsored old-
age and medical benefit programs, and 
not save enough today. Proponents of 
this “overspending” view argue that 
closing the current U.S. trade deficit 
will require some policy actions to in-
crease savings in the U.S. Absent these 
policy changes, researchers expect that 
closing the trade deficit may involve 
some dramatic events. For instance, 
economists Maurice Obstfeld and 
Kenneth Rogoff argue that restoring 
trade balance will require a large de-
preciation of the U.S. dollar. Similarly, 
economists Nouriel Roubini and Brad 
Setser have argued that financing the 
international debt incurred follow-
ing these persistent trade deficits will 
require an increase in interest rates 
that will discourage investment and 
economic growth.
The properties of the trade bal-
ance, evident over the last almost 
century and a half in the U.S. as well 
as over the business cycle among in-
dustrialized countries, provide ample 
The trade balance reflects the optimal 
response of individuals, firms, investors, 
and governments to changes in productive 
opportunities and needs throughout the world.
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13 Economists David Backus and Patrick Kehoe 
find similar properties of the data for a broader 
group of countries over different periods.evidence of substantial production 
shifting and consumption smoothing 
and cast doubt on this overspending 
view. 
SUMMARY
The current U.S. trade deficit ap-
pears unusually large when compared 
with that in the postwar period. But 
in the postwar period, the mobility 
of capital was fairly limited. In com-
parison to an earlier era of fairly free 
mobility of international capital, the 
current U.S. trade deficits don’t look so 
unusual. 
Trade deficits tend to be a sign 
of good things to come. Countries 
tend to run trade deficits when they 
are borrowing to finance productive 
investment opportunities. This is a 
way to shift world production toward 
more productive locations. This inter-
national borrowing and lending has 
played a prominent role in some of the 
most significant events in U.S. history 
— from the western expansion after 
the Civil War to the financing of the 
two world wars. Over the business 
cycle, we also see that trade deficits are 
often associated with strong and con-
tinued economic growth and are a sign 
of good things to come. B R




Standard deviation relative to GDP Correlation with GDP
Consumption Investment Consumption Investment Trade Balance
0.80 2.84 0.88 0.70 -0.15
France 0.92 3.14 0.74 0.89 -0.43
Germany 0.88 2.32 0.66 0.78 -0.16
Italy 1.32 3.28 0.66 0.76 -0.37
Japan 0.67 2.54 0.64 0.91 -0.48
United Kingdom 1.17 3.34 0.86 0.74 -0.52
United States 0.75 2.75 0.85 0.94 -0.52
Mean - G7 0.93 2.89 0.75 0.82 -0.38
* Consumption, investment, GDP, and trade data are from the OECD's Quarterly National Accounts data set, from 1980:Q1 to 2002:Q2. The 
Hodrick-Prescott filter was used to remove the long-term trends in each data series.10 Q1 2007 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
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